Physical Evil vs Moral Evil in *Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions

Title: Physical Evil vs Moral Evil in *Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions*

In the *Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions*, the distinction between moral and physical evil is central to understanding Peter’s discourse on the nature of sin, human responsibility, and the justice of God. The text consistently emphasizes that moral evil arises from the freedom of human will, while physical evil exists as part of God’s providential arrangement for the Natural World. This distinction is crucial for reconciling the existence of suffering and the apparent success of the wicked with the goodness of God. In these chapters, moral evil is presented as a product of ignorance and willful choice, while physical evil is treated as a necessary aspect of created existence, not as a flaw in the Creator.

Peter begins the discussion on evil by addressing Simon’s flawed approach to questioning the origin of evil. In Chapter 16, Peter responds to Simon:

> “If you truly wish to learn, then first learn this, how unskilfully you have framed your question; for you say, Since God has created all things, whence is evil? But before you asked this, three sorts of questions should have had the precedence: First, Whether there be evil? Secondly, What evil is? Thirdly, To whom it is, and whence?”

Simon replies dismissively, claiming knowledge and attempting to trap Peter, but Peter corrects him:

> “You say that all confess the existence of evil, which is verily false; for, first of all, the whole Hebrew nation deny its existence.”

Peters statement clarifies that in Jewish theology, the supernatural existence of the devil is denied; even Satan is not a fallen angel. The Serpent in Genesis is symbolic of human impulses, particularly the impulses of Adam and Eve, reflecting the allegorical interpretation found in Philo of Alexandria. This aligns with the *Pseudo-Clementine* position that moral evil originates in human will and ignorance, not as a result of an external, supernatural agent.

Peter further elaborates in Chapter 17, explaining that Simon’s question about evil lacked precision:

> “We do not propose to speak of this now, but only to state the fact that the existence of evil is not universally admitted. But the second question that you should have asked is, What is evil?—a substance, an accident, or an act? And many other things of the same sort.”

Here Peter is establishing the need for careful categorization. Moral evil, as a consequence of human action, must be distinguished from the structural or physical evils inherent in the Natural World. Chapter 18 emphasizes the method of inquiry:

> “If indeed as wishing to learn, I have something to teach you first, that coming by consequence and the right order of doctrine, you may understand from yourself what evil is. But if you ask merely for the sake of raising a question and disputing, let each of us first set forth his opinion, and so let the matter be debated.”

Peter insists that the study of evil requires order, reflection, and acknowledgment of human responsibility, pointing toward a moral dimension rooted in choice.

Chapter 19 extends this theme by highlighting the role of intention and desire for truth in understanding evil:

> “But in addition to all this, all these people stand here constrained by the love of God, and by a desire to know the truth, and therefore all these are to be regarded as one, by reason of their affection being one and the same towards the truth...through the mercy of God, that He will give the palm of victory to him who preaches the truth, that He may make manifest to them the herald of truth.”

Here, moral comprehension is linked to freedom and intention, underscoring the human responsibility to discern good from evil.

Peter proceeds to define moral evil in terms of human freedom. In Chapter 21, he asserts:

> “You admit, then, that something is in the power of the will: only confess this, if it is so, and let us inquire, as you say, concerning God.”

Simon initially resists, claiming that all is predetermined by fate. Peter counters in Chapter 22, stressing the absurdity of denying human responsibility:

> “See, my brethren, into what absurdities Simon has fallen, who before my coming was teaching that men have it in their power to be wise and to do what they will, but now, driven into a corner by the force of my arguments, he denies that man has any power either of perceiving or of acting...Miserable also will those be who laboriously keep righteousness; but blessed those who, living in pleasure, exercise tyranny, living in luxury and wickedness.”

The text underscores the necessity of free will as the foundation of moral responsibility. Human beings are accountable for their actions, and moral evil results from the misuse of this freedom.

Chapter 23 clarifies the origin of evil and introduces the idea that physical evil, unlike moral evil, is not rooted in human choice:

> “The power of choice is the sense of the soul, possessing a quality by which it can be inclined towards what acts it wills...if what God wishes to be, is; and what He does not wish to be, is not.”

Peter explains that while God’s will governs the necessary motions of the Natural World, humans direct the voluntary motions of their own actions. Moral evil arises when the will and judgment of the mind deviate from righteousness.

Peter further distinguishes between moral and physical evil in Chapter 24:

> “For every motion is divided into two parts, so that a certain part is moved by necessity, and another by will; those things which are moved by necessity are always in motion, those which are moved by will, not always...But there are other things, in which there is a power of will, and which have a free choice of doing what they will. These, as you have said, do not remain always in that order in which they were created: but according as their will leads them, and the judgment of their mind inclines them, they effect either good or evil; and therefore He has proposed rewards to those who do well, and penalties to those who do evil.”

This passage makes explicit that physical processes—such as the motion of the sun and the stars—occur by necessity, whereas moral evil arises from the conscious exercise of human will.

In Chapter 25, Peter anticipates Simon’s objection:

> “You say, therefore, if God wishes anything to be, it is; and if He do not wish it, it is not...For some things, as we have said, He has so willed to be, that they cannot be otherwise than as they are ordained by Him; and to these He has assigned neither rewards nor punishments; but those which He has willed to be so that they have it in their power to do what they will, He has assigned to them according to their actions and their wills, to earn either rewards or punishments.”

Here, Peter affirms that God is not the author of moral evil, even though He permits its occurrence. Moral evil is contingent upon human freedom, while God is the author of good and the structural order of the world.

Peter also addresses the existence of the visible heaven and its eventual dissolution (Chapters 27–29). He explains that the temporal and visible aspects of the Natural World, including the heaven itself, are not eternal:

> “It was made for the sake of this present life of men, that there might be some sort of interposition and separation, lest any unworthy one might see the habitation of the celestials and the abode of God Himself...But now, that is in the time of the conflict, it has pleased Him that those things be invisible, which are destined as a reward to the conquerers.”

The dissolution of visible heaven illustrates that physical evil or temporality is compatible with divine goodness. God creates transient structures for a purpose, even if they appear flawed or corruptible to human eyes.

Peter repeatedly links ignorance to moral evil. In Chapter 4, he asserts:

> “From all these things, therefore, it is concluded that all evil springs from ignorance; and ignorance herself, the mother of all evils, is sprung from carelessness and sloth...Thus, therefore, are those also who do not know what is true, yet hold some appearance of knowledge, and do many evil things as if they were good, and hasten destruction as if it were to salvation.”

This point resonates with Plato’s statement in the *Gospel of Philip*, also quoted in *Pseudo-Clementine* Recognitions Chapter 8:

> “Ignorance will be found to be the mother of almost all evils.”

Moral evil, then, is not a product of physical forces but arises from lack of knowledge and improper exercise of human will.

Peter addresses the apparent success of the wicked in this life (Chapter 40):

> “Some men who are blasphemers against God, and who spend their whole life in injustice and pleasure die in their own bed and obtain honourable burial; while others who worship God, and maintain their life frugally with all honesty and sobriety, die in deserted places for their observance of righteousness...Where, then, is the justice of God, if there be no immortal soul to suffer punishment in the future for impious deeds, or enjoy rewards for piety and rectitude?”

This demonstrates the need for a moral framework that transcends physical circumstances: moral justice is ultimately linked to accountability in the life to come, which is contingent on the immortal soul’s capacity to experience reward or punishment.

Peter explicitly contrasts the nature of moral and physical evil in Chapter 52:

> “God, who is one and true, has resolved to prepare good and faithful friends for His first begotten; but knowing that none can be good, unless they have in their power that perception by which they may become good...has given to every one the power of his own will, that he may be what he wishes to be. And again, foreseeing that that power of will would make some choose good things and others evil, so that the human race would necessarily be divided into two classes, He has permitted each class to choose both a place and a king, whom they would.”

God’s providence ensures that the human exercise of will produces moral diversity, but all physical elements—including disease, decay, and death—fall under divine necessity. These are not moral evils, nor are they punishments; they are part of the natural order, which Peter treats as under the sovereignty of God.

In Chapters 53–54, Peter emphasizes the importance of self-love and the pursuit of the heavenly kingdom:

> “First of all, then, he is evil, in the judgment of God, who will not inquire what is advantageous to himself. For how can any one love another, if he does not love himself?...Yet He has brought the report of it, under various names and opinions, through successive generations, to the hearing of all: so that whosoever should be lovers of good, hearing it, might inquire and discover what is profitable and salutary to them.”

> “It behooves, therefore, the good to love that way above all things, that is, above riches, glory, rest, parents, relatives, friends, and everything in the world...For whether they be parents, they die; or relatives, they do not continue; or friends, they change. But God alone is eternal, and abides unchangeable.”

Here, moral evil is intimately tied to neglecting the self’s proper orientation toward God and the heavenly reward, whereas physical evil does not impinge upon moral responsibility but provides context for the exercise of virtue.

Peter concludes the discussion on moral and physical evil in Chapters 59 and 36, emphasizing the role of discernment and the power of choice:

> “For, as I was beginning to say, God has appointed for this world certain pairs; and he who comes first of the pairs is of evil, he who comes second, of good...he who is of the evil one, the signs that he works do good to no one; but those which the good man works are profitable to men.”

> “Whoever hears an orderly statement of the truth, cannot by any means gainsay it, but knows that what is spoken is true, provided he also willingly submit to the rules of life. But those who, when they hear, are unwilling to betake themselves to good works, are prevented by the desire of doing evil from acquiescing in those things which they judge to be right.”

Finally, Peter warns against the deception of false teachers, echoing the allegorical use of the serpent (Chapter 42):

> “Armed with the cunning of the old serpent, you stand forth to deceive souls; and therefore, as the serpent you wished to introduce many gods; but now, being confuted in that, you assert that there is no God at all...I shall speak, therefore, but not as compelled by you; for I know how I should speak; and you will be the only one who wants not so much persuasion as admonition on this subject.”

In summary, the *Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions* draw a clear distinction between moral and physical evil. Moral evil is the consequence of human ignorance and misuse of free will, whereas physical evil—such as the transience of the Natural World—is permitted and structured by God’s providence for the ultimate good. There is no need for a supernatural devil in Jewish theology to account for moral failings; rather, human impulses, left ungoverned by reason and knowledge, suffice. The text aligns moral evil with Plato’s identification of ignorance as the root of wrongdoing and parallels the *Gospel of Philip* in emphasizing the transformative potential of knowledge and the moral responsibility of the soul. Physical evil, on the other hand, is a necessary condition of a world governed by divine law and is never morally culpable. Through these chapters, the *Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions* offer a coherent framework in which human choice, divine justice, and the structure of the Natural World coexist without attributing moral fault to the Creator.

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