But, neither are the demons evil by nature; for, if they are evil by nature, neither are they from the Good, nor amongst things existing; nor, in fact, did they change from good, being by nature, and always, evil. Then, are they evil to themselves or to others? If to themselves, they also destroy themselves; but if to others, how destroying, or what destroying?—Essence, or power, or energy? If indeed Essence, in the first place, it is not contrary to nature; for they do not destroy things indestructible by nature, but things receptive of destruction. Then, neither is this an evil for every one, and in every case; but, not even any existing thing is destroyed, in so far as it is essence and nature, but by the defect of nature’s order, the principle of harmony and proportion lacks the power to remain as it was. But the lack of strength is not complete, for the complete lack of power takes away even the disease and the subject; and such a disease will be even a destruction of itself; so that, such a thing is not an evil, but a defective good, for that which has no part of the Good will not be amongst things which exist. And with regard to the destruction of power and energy the principle is the same. Then, how are the demons, seeing they come into being from God, evil? For the Good brings forth and sustains good things. Yet they are called evil, some one may say. But not as they are (for they are from the Good, and obtained a good being), but, as they are not, by not having had strength, as the Oracles affirm, “to keep their first estate.” For in what, tell me, do we affirm that the demons become evil, except in the ceasing in the habit and energy for good things Divine? Otherwise, if the demons are evil by nature, they are always evil; yet evil is unstable. Therefore, if they are always in the same condition, they are not evil; for to be ever the same is a characteristic of the Good. But, if they are not always evil, they are not evil by nature, but by wavering from the angelic good qualities. And they are not altogether without part in the good, in so far as they both are, and live and think, and in one word—as there is a sort of movement of aspiration in them. But they are said to be evil, by reason of their weakness as regards their action according to nature. The evil then, in them, is a turning aside and a stepping out of things befitting themselves, and a missing of aim, and imperfection and impotence, and a weakness and departure, and falling away from the power which preserves their integrity in them. Otherwise, what is evil in demons? An irrational anger—a senseless desire—a headlong fancy.—But these, even if they are in demons, are not altogether, nor in every respect, nor in themselves alone, evils. For even with regard to other living creatures, not the possession of these, but the loss, is both destruction to the creature, and an evil. But the possession saves, and makes to be, the nature of the living creature which possesses them. The tribe of demons then is not evil, so far as it is according to nature, but so far as it is not; and the whole good which was given to them was not changed, but themselves fell from the whole good given. And the angelic gifts which were given to them, we by no means affirm that they were changed, but they exist, and are complete, and all luminous, although the demons themselves do not see, through having blunted their powers of seeing good. So far as they are, they are both from the Good, and are good, and aspire to the Beautiful and the Good, by aspiring to the realities, Being, and Life, and Thought; and by the privation and departure and declension from the good things befitting them, they are called evil, and are evil as regards what they are not: and by aspiring to the non-existent, they aspire to the Evil
But does some one say that souls are evil? If it be that they meet with evil things providentially, and with a view to their preservation, this is not an evil, but a good, and from the Good, Who makes even the evil good. But, if we say that souls become evil, in what respect do they become evil, except in the failure of their good habits and energies; and, by reason of their own lack of strength, missing their aim and tripping? For we also say, that the air around us becomes dark by failure and absence of light, and yet the light itself is always light, that which enlightens even the darkness. The Evil, then, is neither in demons nor in us, as an existent evil, but as a failure and dearth of the perfection of our own proper goods.
Demons Are Not Evil by Nature: A Study of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite
The Biblical medical interpretation of demons, as understood by certain Christian perspectives, notably rejects the idea that demons are supernatural beings or entities with inherent evil. Instead, it views demons as symbolic representations of human wickedness, illness, or false gods in the Bible. The Biblical medical perspective, for example, considers demons not as malevolent spirits but as manifestations of internal struggles and external influences that are detrimental to human nature. This perspective contrasts significantly with that of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, a Christian mystic and philosopher who interpreted demons as real spiritual beings—fallen from a state of original goodness but still retaining some aspect of their created nature.
One of the key distinctions in the views of Pseudo-Dionysius and the Biblical medical interpretation is their respective conceptions of the nature of demons. According to Dionysius, demons are not inherently evil by nature, but rather have turned away from the original goodness with which they were created. He writes:
“But, neither are the demons evil by nature; for, if they are evil by nature, neither are they from the Good, nor amongst things existing; nor, in fact, did they change from good, being by nature, and always, evil. Then, are they evil to themselves or to others? If to themselves, they also destroy themselves; but if to others, how destroying, or what destroying?” (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names).
This passage clearly establishes Dionysius' view that demons are not intrinsically evil. Instead, they were created as good beings, as all things are by nature derived from the Good, and their fall into what is perceived as evil is a result of a deviation from the intended path of goodness. Dionysius does not view the demons as permanent embodiments of evil, as evil is considered unstable and changeable. In his view, demons became evil only by failing to uphold the harmony and perfection of their created nature, thus drifting from their original state.
He continues:
“How are the demons, seeing they come into being from God, evil? For the Good brings forth and sustains good things. Yet they are called evil, some one may say. But not as they are (for they are from the Good, and obtained a good being), but, as they are not, by not having had strength, as the Oracles affirm, ‘to keep their first estate.’” (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names).
Dionysius emphasizes that the demons' deviation from their original state of goodness stems not from their inherent nature but from their failure to maintain their position of goodness. The notion of "keeping their first estate" reflects the idea that demons, like all creatures, were meant to remain in a state of alignment with divine goodness. However, their fall occurred when they lost the strength to adhere to that state.
In Dionysian thought, the evil that demons embody is not a static or essential characteristic but a failure—a lack of strength and aspiration toward the Good. Dionysius elaborates further:
“The evil then, in them, is a turning aside and a stepping out of things befitting themselves, and a missing of aim, and imperfection and impotence, and a weakness and departure, and falling away from the power which preserves their integrity in them.” (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names).
Here, Dionysius underscores that demons' actions are not inherently evil; instead, their moral failing is a result of straying from their original purpose. This deviation, according to Dionysius, leads to a weakening of their powers and an inability to act in accordance with their created nature, which was originally aligned with goodness. Thus, the "evil" attributed to demons is not a creation of intrinsic malevolence but a product of their failed potential.
Interestingly, Dionysius extends this idea of imperfection to human beings as well. Just as demons are not evil by nature but by their departure from goodness, so too, humans fall into sin and evil through their failure to maintain their intended harmony with the Good:
“But does some one say that souls are evil? If it be that they meet with evil things providentially, and with a view to their preservation, this is not an evil, but a good, and from the Good, Who makes even the evil good.” (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names).
In this context, Dionysius explains that evil is not an ontological force that exists independently but is instead the result of a failure to achieve the full potential of goodness. The fall of demons, as well as the fall of human souls, is characterized by an absence or lack of the good, not the active presence of evil. Evil, then, is not a thing in itself but the absence or deprivation of the good that was meant to be.
Dionysius' view of demons challenges the idea that they are inherently evil beings bent on destruction or chaos. Instead, demons are seen as beings that were created good but became corrupted due to their inability to maintain their original state. The evil they embody is not an intrinsic nature but the result of their failure to remain aligned with the divine Good. The key takeaway from Dionysian thought is that evil is not an independent force but a failure—a turning away from the intended order and perfection.
Thus, the Biblical medical interpretation, which views demons as symbols of human weakness, illness, and spiritual fallenness, shares some similarities with Dionysius’ view in its understanding that demons represent a departure from the intended good. However, the essential difference lies in the Biblical medical perspective’s view of demons as not personal entities at all but as representations of moral and physical corruption. In contrast, Dionysius’ philosophy maintains that demons are fallen spiritual entities, who, though corrupted, retain some trace of their original goodness.
